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Abstract— 3GPP introduced the key management mecha-
nism (KMM) in evolved multimedia broadcast/multicast
service (eMBMS) to provide forward security and backward
security for multicast contents. In this paper, we point out that
KMM may lead to frequent rekeying and re-authentication issues
due to eMBMS’s characteristics: 1) massive group members; 2)
dynamic group topology; and 3) unexpected wireless disconnec-
tions. Such issues expose extra load for both user equipment (UE)
terminals and mobile operators. It seems prolonging the rekeying
interval is an intuitive solution to minimizing the impact of the
issues. However, a long rekeying interval is not considered the best
operational solution due to revenue loss of content providers. This
paper quantifies the tradeoff between the load of the UEs and
the operators as well as the revenue loss of the content providers.
Moreover, we emphasize how essential this rekeying interval has
impacts on the problems. Using our proposed tradeoff model, the
operators can specify a suitable rekeying interval to best balance
the interest between the above three parties. The tradeoff model
is validated by extensive simulations and is demonstrated to be
an effective approach for the tradeoff analysis and optimization
on eMBMS.
Index Terms— Performance analysis, LTE, multimedia
broadcast and multicast service (MBMS), key management.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN LONG-TERM Evolution (LTE), the 3rd GenerationPartnership Project (3GPP) introduced the evolved Multi-
media Broadcast/Multicast Service (eMBMS) [1]–[5] to mul-
ticast/broadcast multimedia content to a large number of
User Equipment (UE) terminals. It is expected that eMBMS
could significantly reduce delivery cost and increase efficiency.
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An example is live sports, where a large amount of users
want to watch a game simultaneously. On January 27, 2014,
the South Korean operator KT announced the world’s first
commercial LTE eMBMS services, named Olleh LTE Play.
As commercial eMBMS services are announced, both oper-
ators and content providers want to gain additional revenues
by offering eMBMS services. A key issue is to guarantee
that only users who have paid can enjoy the eMBMS service.
3GPP introduced Key Management Mechanism (KMM) [6] to
provide forward security and backward security for multicast
content, while a multicast group is maintained, in which only
UEs belonging to the same group can receive the multicast
data [7]. A group key is shared by the group members to
encrypt and decrypt data. When a member joins/leaves the
group, the group key needs to be updated to add/revoke
the member, which is referred to as rekeying. Accordingly,
the users holding old keys are unable to access subsequent
contents. Such rekeying operations minimize security risks and
provide both forward security and backward security.
The KMM, however, may lead to (1) frequent rekeying
issue and (2) re-authentication issue due to eMBMS’s char-
acteristics: massive group members, dynamic group topology,
and unexpected wireless disconnections. The frequent rekeying
issue imposes signaling load for UEs when UEs join/leave
the service group randomly. Considering Super Bowl using
eMBMS for live show as an example, there are large number of
users in the eMBMS service group, which may join the group
to watch the show, or leave the group randomly (e.g., during
quarter/half time breaks, or even caused by operators’ resource
allocation scheme [8]). Although such random behavior is not
unique in eMBMS, it becomes more serious than that in other
wireless multicast, such as ad hoc networks, sensor networks,
and wireless local area networks. To be more specific, the
number of UEs in an eMBMS multicast group is usually more
than that in other wireless networks. An eMBMS service is
likely to have ten thousand, or even more number of UEs in its
multicast group. Given the large number of UEs in the group,
such random behavior may cause much higher UE arrival
(departure) rate than other wireless networks. A wireless
sensor network, for example, targeted at environmental mon-
itoring applications may have thousands of sensors. But
these sensor nodes usually provide services throughout
their whole lifetime without moving until their energy is
depleted.
1536-1276 © 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
8464 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS, VOL. 15, NO. 12, DECEMBER 2016
The re-authentication issue results in extra authentication
load for Core Network (CN) and is mainly caused by miss-
ing rekeying information when UEs suffer from unexpected
disconnections. Given the fact that a UE with old keys is
unable to access subsequent eMBMS contents, the UE needs
to perform authentication procedure with CN again to retrieve
new keys. Such problem is more serious in eMBMS than in
the aforementioned wireless networks. First, frequent rekeying
increases the probability that rekeying information is lost.
If there is no connection (e.g., blind spot, poor signal, or
being out of coverage, etc.), the UE may miss the rekey-
ing information. Second, in unicast, if the UE losses the
rekeying information, retransmission mechanisms can be used.
In eMBMS, however, the CN will still update the group
key even if some of the UEs do not receive the rekeying
information correctly. Therefore, those UEs which missed the
rekeying information will not be able to derive new keys.
Re-authentication procedure will be triggered, imposing extra
authentication load for CN.
Overall, with short-term security keys, it will cause the
above two issues. Alternatively, it seems that a very long-
term key is a straightforward solution to minimize the impact
for CN and UEs. However, how to prolong rekeying interval is
not intuitive because long-term keys may compromise forward
security and lead to revenue loss for content providers. That
is, the UEs left the eMBMS service group can still access
the subsequent contents because their keys are still under
using. On the other hand, frequent rekeying imposes extra
authentication load for CN and signaling load for UEs. The
tradeoff is called the security-performance tradeoff.
The key question network operators might have is how
to specify a rekeying interval to best balance the security-
performance tradeoff. The answer to this question, however,
may not exist due to the fact that such an interval should
be determined by a network operator. Besides, management
policies should also be taken into consideration. In this paper,
we develop an analytical model to quantify the tradeoff
between the load of the UEs and the operators (CN) as well
as revenue loss of the content providers. As a first step toward
this model, we firstly identify the frequent rekeying issue
and re-authentication issue, and then define two performance
metrics respectively to evaluate the load for UEs and CN.
Next, targeting at an acceptable upper bound of revenue loss
for a content provider, we model it as a performance metric to
represent the interest of the content provider. After modeling
the three metrics, we conduct extensive simulations using ns-2.
The simulation results not only validate our analytical model
but also show the impacts on UEs, CN, and content providers
if the operator adjusts rekeying interval to alleviate the load
for UEs and CN.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents background and problem statement. Section III
presents the proposed algorithm. The analytical model is
illustrated in Section IV, followed by the numerical results
in Section V. In Section VI, we discuss optimal strate-
gies. Section VII reviews the related work. In Section VIII,
we conclude this paper.
Fig. 1. Simplified example of eMBMS architecture.
II. BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section, we first introduce the background of eMBMS
KMM, and then point out its shortcomings in practical
applications.
A. Background
The eMBMS KMM architecture defined in [6] consists
of Bootstrapping Server Function (BSF), Broadcast Multicast
Service Centre (BM-SC), content provider, eMBMS gateway,
and UEs, as shown in Fig. 1. More precisely, BSF is a part of
Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) which establishes
shared secrets between UEs and BM-SC. The BM-SC acts as
an entry point for content delivery services (both live streams
from encoders and multimedia contents from the content
provider), and forwards the broadcast multicast packets to the
eMBMS gateway from where the packets are distributed to
evolved NodeB (eNB) in the Radio Access Network (RAN).
In this paper, we only show BSF, BM-SC, and eMBMS
gateway in the CN. Other components which are not relevant
to this paper are not shown.
In order to protect the eMBMS data, 3GPP defined a set of
four security keys in eMBMS KMM [2], [6], which are MBMS
Request Key (MRK), MBMS Service Key (MSK), MBMS
Traffic Key (MTK), and MBMS User Key (MUK). MRK
and MUK are derived using GBA key derivation function [9].
MRK is to authenticate a UE to a BM-SC when performing
key requests. MUK is used to protect the distribution of MSK,
while MSK is used to protect a certain eMBMS session and the
transmission of MTK. MTK is responsible for encrypting and
decrypting eMBMS traffic. In short, MUK, MSK, and MTK
are used to protect data (see their relationship in Fig. 2).
During an eMBMS service, MSK/MTK is (are) updated
(referred to rekeying in this paper) when one of the following
events happens: a) Event 1 (E1): a new UE joins the eMBMS
session; b) Event 2 (E2): a joined UE leaves the eMBMS
session; c) Event 3 (E3): the timer of MSK expires; and
d) Event 4 (E4): the timer of MTK expires. In order to
update MSK/MTK, User Service Join procedure (for E1),
User Service Leave procedure (for E2), MSK Periodic Update
procedure (for E3), and MTK Periodic Update procedure
(for E4) are conducted [2], [6], [10].
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Fig. 2. Relationship between MUK, MSK, MTK, and eMBMS data.
Fig. 3. Procedure of a new UE joins a MBMS user service - message flow.
Here, we show a simplified example of User Service Join
procedure for E1 in Fig. 3, where UE{1...n} denote the UEs
which have already joined the service, and UEn+1 is a new UE.
• Step 1: The new UE, UEn+1, first sends a service join
request to the BM-SC. The BM-SC then will ask UEn+1
to initiate the bootstrap authentication procedure with
the BSF.
• Step 2: The UEn+1 performs the bootstrapping authen-
tication procedure with the BSF to obtain MRKn+1 and
then derives MUKn+1 based on the MRKn+1.
• Step 3: After the UEn+1 has derived MRKn+1 and
MUKn+1, it performs authentication with the BM-SC
using the MRKn+1.
• Step 4: The BM-SC generates a new MSK, MSKnew, and
unicasts MIKEY message [11] over UDP to transport
the MSKnew to every UE that has joined the service
by Dedicated Control Channel (DCCH) and Dedicated
Traffic Channel (DTCH) [5], [6]. The message sent to
UEk (k ∈ [1, n]) is protected by the corresponding
MUKk .
• Step 5: The BM-SC generates a new MTK, MTKnew,
encrypted by MSKnew, and multicasts it over UDP to
Fig. 4. An example of forward security.
Fig. 5. Example of backward security.
every UE that has joined the service by MBMS point-to-
multipoint Control Channel (MCCH) and MBMS point-
to-multipoint Traffic Channel (MTCH) [5], [6].
B. Problem Statement
eMBMS KMM may lead to frequent rekeying issue and
re-authentication issue. For the sake of security, KMM has
to guarantee both forward security and backward security.
In other words, a UE revoked from the eMBMS service
group at time t will not be able to access the encrypted
content after time t (see Fig. 4 as an example). In contrast,
ensuring backward security requires that a UE, which joined
the eMBMS service at time t , is not able to access any keys
used to encrypt data before time t , as shown in Fig. 5. Formal
definition of forward security and backward security are given
in Definitions 1 and 2.
Definition 1 (Forward Security): Forward security is pro-
vided if for any set Rt ⊂ UE, where Rt is a set of revoked
UEs before time t. It is computationally infeasible for UEs
from Rt working together to get any information about Kt ′
(t ′ ≥ t), even when previous security keys {K1, · · · , Kt−1} are
available.
Definition 2 (Backward Security): Backward security is
provided if for any set At ⊂ UE, where At is a set of
added UEs after time t. It is computationally infeasible for
UEs from At working together to obtain any knowledge
about Kt ′ (t ′ < t), even when a set of security keys
{Kt , Kt+1, · · · , Km} after time t are available.
Issue 1 (Frequent Rekeying Issue): By providing both for-
ward security and backward security, we can minimize the
security risk as well as protect content providers’ interest from
freeloaders. However, it will lead to the frequent rekeying issue
if UEs join/leave the service frequently. More specifically, to
guarantee forward security, if a joined UE leaves the eMBMS
service (E2), the rest of the UEs need to update their MSK
and MTK. After the UE left the service group, rekeying
procedure is performed to update new keys MTKnew and
MSKnew to the rest of UEs. The UE holding MTKold and
MSKold will not be able to access the subsequent content,
i.e., MTKold and MSKold are revoked. On the other hand,
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to ensure backward security, all UEs in the service have
to update their MSK and MTK if a new UE joins the
eMBMS service (E1) (see Step 4 and Step 5). In other words,
rekeying rate grows when UE joining/leaving rate increases.
As discussed in Section I, the characteristics of eMBMS lead
to much higher UE joining/leaving rate than that in other
wireless multicast cases, resulting in much higher rekeying
rate as well.
Issue 2 (Re-authentication issue): Missing rekeying infor-
mation will cause the re-authentication issue, and the above
frequent rekeying issue makes it even more serious. Specif-
ically, in KMM, security key(s) (we use K to denote either
MSK or MTK, etc.) is/are updated to provide forward security.
In other words, the security key Ki is evolved if and only if
one knows the previous key, i.e., Ki ⇒ Ki+1 and Ki  K j
(i ≥ 1, j ≥ i + 2). The key evolvement (say from Ki to K j )
will fail if any key Kk (i < k < j ) is missing. In eMBMS, the
consequence of key evolvement failure is that the UE will not
be able to decrypt the eMBMS content encrypted by the new
key K j . The eMBMS service is thus interrupted from UE’s
perspective.
To be more specific, the rekeying information may be lost
in the following two cases: (1) MSKnew may be lost due
to UDP transmission. The updated MSKnew is unicast in
MIKEY message to every UE joined the eMBMS services over
UDP [5], [6]. There is no ACK to confirm that the UEs have
received the updated MSKnew correctly [6]. (2) MTKnew may
also be lost during multicast transmission. In Step 5 in Fig. 3,
the MTKnew is multicast to every UE joined the service over
UDP [5], [6]. A UE will not send an error message to the
BM-SC because of not receiving an MTK message [6]. The
eMBMS KMM will still update security keys even if some
UEs do not receive the rekeying information correctly.
In short, missing MTKnew will cause that the UEs cannot
decrypt current eMBMS content. In addition, missing MSKnew
will lead to that the UEs cannot obtain MTKnew encrypted by
the MSKnew (see Step 5 in Fig. 3). Therefore, a UE will not
be able to continue to access eMBMS content if any of these
keys is missing. Thus, the UE needs to perform authentication
procedure with the BM-SC again to retrieve new keys, which
leads to the re-authentication issue.
III. PROPOSED DYNAMIC REKEYING ALGORITHM (DRA)
To solve the aforementioned issues, we propose an algo-
rithm called Dynamic Rekeying Algorithm (DRA). The DRA
is performed by operators to determine whether rekeying
should be conducted. No modification is required at the UE
side. DRA is designed to update security key(s) based on
a dynamic time slot, instead of updating them whenever a
UE joins/leaves the eMBMS session (E1/E2 happens). It is
easy to know that a very long rekeying time slot can alleviate
the frequent rekeying and re-authentication issues. However,
it may incur free enjoying time for freeloaders, which leads to
revenue loss of content providers. To balance the tradeoff, we
define a performance metric as an upper bound of acceptable
revenue loss for the interest of the content providers. Rekeying
is then performed based on the upper bound of revenue
loss.
Fig. 6. An example of possible free enjoy time when UEs leave the eMBMS
session.
To be more specific, Fig. 6 shows the dynamic key update
procedure of DRA. For simplicity, we use K to denote either
MSK or MTK, and Update-Key to present MSK/MTK updat-
ing procedures. Once Update-Key is triggered, the security
key, Ki , is updated to a new key, Ki+1, i.e., Ki → Ki+1.
In Fig. 6(a) we can see that Update-Key is triggered by
dynamic time slots. At time {t1, t2, · · · , ti , · · · , tn}, the secu-
rity key, K , is updated as time goes by, i.e., K1 → K2 →
· · · → Ki → · · · → Kn. Fig. 6(b) further illustrates a
zoom-in picture of the time slot [ti−1, ti ]. The red arrow
(with smaller arrow size) denotes a UE joining the eMBMS
service, and the blue one (with bigger arrow size) denotes a
UE leaving the service. We can see that even more than one
(could be many) UEs join/leave the service during [ti−1, ti ],
the DRA only performs Update-Key two times at ti−1 and ti ,
respectively. Such design significantly reduces the rekeying
cost and frequency for both UEs and CN. However, left UEs
are still able to access the subsequence content by ti because
their security key Ki−1 is still under using, which leads to
revenue loss of content providers.
Content providers’ interest should be also taken into consid-
eration. Normally, content providers charge for the eMBMS
multimedia contents they provide. For example, quota-based
plan allows users to select from different usage quota lim-
its. Volume-based (usage-based) plan charges users based
on their usage [12], [13]. For the pay for what you use
pricing model,1 one of the basic requirements is to record
the volume used by the users. Missing the usage records
leads to revenue loss for the content providers. Specifically,
let us further zoom in the time slot [ti−1, ti ] and show it
in Fig. 6(c). We can see that the key Ki−1 obtained at ti−1
is valid for the whole time slot [ti−1, ti ). Considering a UE
leaves the group at sk as an example, the UE can still freely
enjoy the multicast content during [sk, ti ) because it holds
Ki−1 (forward security is not guaranteed, see Definition 1).
1Unlimited, flat-rate plan for multimedia contents is out of the scope of this
paper.
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In contrast, if a UE joins the group at sk , the UE is able
to decrypt the multicast content transmitted during [ti−1, sk ]
(backward security is not provided, see Definition 2). The two
cases show that prolonging rekeying time interval leads to
revenue loss (free enjoy time) for content providers. Therefore,
selecting a suitable rekeying time interval is a tradeoff between
UE (signaling cost), operators (CN cost and RAN cost), and
content providers (revenue loss).
Here, we quantify the free enjoy time that the content
provider is going to lose if the rekeying intervals are pro-
longed. An accumulated free enjoy time factor constrained
by both forward security and backward security is defined as
follows:
φ = ωb
N(ti )∑
k=N(ti−1 )+1
(
sk − ti−1
)
+ ω f
N(ti )∑
k=N(ti−1 )+1
(
ti − sk
)
,
(1)
for the upper bound of the free enjoy time, where ωb and
ω f are weights for backward security and forward security,
N(ti ) is the number of UEs leaving the multicast group within
[0, ti ], and sN(ti ) is the time when N(ti )-th UE leaves the
group. By adjusting ωb and ω f , operators can easily increase
or decrease the weight of either backward security or forward
security based on their management policies.
In eMBMS, we consider that forward security is more
important than backward security. Normally it is less motivated
for UEs to compromise backward security because they have
to record the multicast content in advance and then decrypt
them using the key Ki−1 obtained at sk to get a small piece
of free multicast content, e.g., multicast content transmitted in
[ti−1, sk). For simplicity, we set ωb = 0 and ω f = 1 in Eq. (1)
to get the accumulated free enjoy time factor constrained by
forward security,2
φ =
N(ti )∑
k=N(ti−1 )+1
(
ti − sk
)
, (2)
for the upper bound free enjoy time. Here, we refer the excess
time interval [sk, ti ) as free enjoy time interval. When the
accumulated free enjoy time interval, φ, reaches to a prede-
fined threshold, φth , the Update-Key is triggered for rekeying
procedure. Operators thus can easily adjust rekey time interval
by setting φth , while the interests of UEs, operators, and
content providers are taken into consideration.
Discussion: Mobile operators could interpret φ in two ways
once φ is derived: revenue gain and revenue loss. When φ is
considered as revenue gain, Eq. (2) quantifies extra incomes
for content providers. For example, nowadays mobile operators
usually charge a certain rate for a certain time. If a mobile
operator will charge $0.1 for 10 seconds, a user will still need
to pay for $0.1 even if the user only talks for 3 seconds.
Similarly, the φ can be considered as the extra gain of content
providers if mobile operators ask users to pay for the whole
rekeying time slot.
2It can be modified to support backward security, or both backward security
and forward security by adjusting ωb and ω f .
Whereas, when φ is considered as the revenue loss of
content providers, there could be freeloader attacks against
such setting. Specifically, attackers could try to register for a
very short time and only pay for the actual registered time,
and then enjoy the rest of the rekeying time slots for free. For
example, the attacker registers and pays for only 5 seconds in
the beginning of every slot. If the rekeying time slots are long
(say 120 seconds), the attacker could pay less for the content.
However, to enjoy the service continuously, the attacker needs
to jump in/out the service frequently. Although there could be
more countermeasures for such attack, here we introduce three
solutions.
1) Charge connection fee: Nowadays, many operators
charge connection fee, say $1.99, for the first 3 minutes,
and then charge additional $0.1 for each 10 seconds.
A user will be charged at least for $1.99 even if the
user talks for less than 3 minutes. Similar idea could be
used for eMBMS. For instance, mobile operators could
charge κ rekeying time slots (say κ = 3) for connection
fee when a UE joins the eMBMS service. In other words,
a user has to pay for the first κ rekeying time slots no
matter how long it stays in the service.
2) Block users with unusual registration frequencies: For
UEs with unusual registration frequencies, mobile
operators could block the UEs for a certain time
interval, which can be exponentially increased.
In addition, Turing test mechanism could be applied
(e.g., CAPTCHAS [14]). Those users with unusual
registration frequencies could be asked for some tests
that are easy for humans to pass but difficult for
computers to understand.
3) Change the length of rekeying time slot dynamically:
The rekeying time slot can be changed dynamically so
an attacker will not be able to figure out the length of
rekeying slot.
As a conclusion, mobile operators can specify the rekeying
time interval according to their management policies. Our
study quantifies the accumulated free enjoy time (potential
revenue gain/loss) and gives theoretical guidelines for opera-
tors to configure the parameters. The operators can interpret
φ based on their needs.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we propose an analytic model to investigate
the rekeying cost and re-authentication cost of DRA where the
rekeying interval is prolonged. For performance comparison,
we denote the original rekeying based on UE join/leave as
Traditional Rekeying Algorithm (TRA).
The parameters used in the analysis are listed in Table I.
In the analysis, the inter-arrival time of the UEs is assumed
to be exponentially distributed with mean 1/λ. When a UE
joins the eMBMS session, the UE stays in the session for a
time interval, tu , with the expected value 1θ , probability density
function (pdf) fu(·), cumulative distribution function (CDF)
Fu(·), and the Laplace transform f ∗u (s). Further, let N and
M be the number of UEs joined the eMBMS session and
the number of UEs left the eMBMS session within an obser-
vation time interval Ts . The problem can be modeled as an
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TABLE I
LIST OF PARAMETERS
M/G/∞ system. In other words, observed by an eMBMS
session, UE arrivals follow Poisson process and are served
immediately. The time period that a UE stays in the session tu
follows a general distribution.
In Section IV-A, we analyze the rekeying cost of TRA and
DRA. We then derive re-authentication costs of TRA and DRA
in Section IV-B.
A. Rekeying Cost
1) Rekeying Cost of TRA: Recall that in TRA whenever a
UE joins/leaves the eMBMS session, Update-Key is triggered
to assign new keys to add/revoke UEs to/from the eMBMS
multicast group. It is straightforward to know that the expected
total rekeying cost is the total number of UEs joined the
group and left the group, i.e., E[N] + E[M], where E[N]
is the expected number of N , and E[M] is the expected
number of M . In an observation time interval, Ts , E[N] is
computed as:
E[N] = λTs . (3)
Similarly, E[M] in Ts is:
E[M] = λd Ts , (4)
where λd is the mean of UE’s departure rate in Ts .
Next, we will derive the relationship between UE arrival
rate, λ, and UE departure rate, λd . We first consider the
probability that a UE arriving at time s will leave by time t is
P{tu ≤ t−s}, i.e., Fu(t−s). Then, P{tu > t−s} = 1−Fu(t−s)
is the probability that a UE arriving at time s will still be
present at time t . Therefore, the probability that an arbitrary
UE arrived before t is still in the session at t is given by:
Pt =
∫ t
0 P{tu > t − s|S = s}P{S = s}ds. Because arrivals of
UEs follow Poisson distribution, according to Theorem 5.2
in [15], P{S = s} is uniform distributed on (0, t). Thus,
P{S = s} = 1t . We have:
Pt = 1
t
∫ t
0
P{tu > t − s|S = s}ds
= 1
t
∫ t
0
[
1 − Fu(t − s)
]
ds = 1
t
∫ t
0
[
1 − Fu(s)
]
ds.
From [16], the probability that m numbers of UEs leave the
session at time t is given by:
P{M(t) = m} =
[
λ(1 − Pt )t
]m
e−λ(1−Pt )t
m! . (5)
From Eq. (5), we can derive the departure rate of UEs in the
session as:
λd = λ(1 − Pt )
= λ
{
1 − 1
t
∫ t
0
[
1 − Fu(s)
]
ds
}
. (6)
We observe from Eq. (6) that λd is a random variable over t .
Initially, λd is zero because no UE leaves the session at
the beginning. As t → ∞, we see that Pt goes to zero.
It means that the inter-departure process is Poisson process in
steady state, which is precisely the same as the arrival process.
In other words, in steady state, the departure rate of UEs, λd ,
is exactly the same as the arrival rate, λ, i.e., λd = λ. Thus,
Eq. (4) is rewritten as:
E[M] = λd Ts = λTs . (7)
From Eq. (3) and Eq. (7), the rekeying cost of TRA in Ts is
given as:
CT R A = E[N] + E[M] = 2λTs . (8)
2) Rekeying Cost of DRA: Recall that the basic idea of DRA
is to update security keys when the accumulated free enjoy
time φ increases to the predefined threshold φth no matter how
many UEs join/leave the session. That is, the keys are changed
based on time slots, ti , i ∈ [1, n], constrained on φth . The
rekeying cost of DRA is then derived as:
CD R A = TsE(ti ) . (9)
In the following, we will derive E(ti ) in Eq. (9). As illus-
trated in Fig. 6, UEs depart at time sN(ti−1)+1, sN(ti−1)+2, · · · ,
sN(ti ). The expected sum of free enjoy times of UEs depart in
(ti−1, ti ) is given by:
E[φ] = E
[ N(ti )∑
k=N(ti−1 )+1
(ti − sk)
]
= E
[
E
[ N(ti )∑
k=N(ti−1 )+1
(ti − sk)
∣∣∣N(ti ), N(ti−1)
]]
 E
[
A
]
, (10)
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where A = E
[∑N(ti )
k=N(ti−1 )+1(ti −sk)
∣∣∣N(ti ), N(ti−1)
]
. We then
get a conditional A for N(ti ) = n2, and N(ti−1) = n1 as:
E
[ N(ti )∑
k=N(ti−1 )+1
(ti − sk)
∣∣∣∣N(ti ) = n2, N(ti−1) = n1
]
= E
[ n2∑
k=n1+1
(ti − sk)
∣∣∣∣N(ti ) = n2, N(ti−1) = n1
]
= E
[ n2∑
k=n1+1
(ti − sk)
]
= E
[
(n2 − n1)E(ti ) −
n2∑
k=n1+1
(sk)
]
= (n2 − n1)E(ti ) − E
[ n2∑
k=n1+1
sk
]
. (11)
In steady state, the output of M/G/∞ is Poisson process.
From [15, Th. 5.2], the N(ti ) − N(ti−1) departure times
sN(ti−1)+1, sN(ti−1)+2, · · · , sN(ti ) have the same distribution
as the order statistics corresponding to n independent ran-
dom variables uniformly distributed on the interval (ti−1, ti ).
We then have:
E
[ n2∑
k=n1+1
sk
]
= 1
2
(n2 − n1)E(ti + ti−1). (12)
According to Eq. (12), Eq. (11) is then rewritten as:
E
[ N(ti )∑
k=N(ti−1 )+1
(ti − sk)
∣∣∣∣N(ti ) = n2, N(ti−1) = n1
]
= (n2 − n1)E(ti ) − 12 (n2 − n1)E(ti + ti−1)
= 1
2
(n2 − n1)E(ti − ti−1),
which yields:
A = E
[ N(ti )∑
k=N(ti−1 )+1
(ti − sk)
∣∣∣N(ti ), N(ti−1)
]
= 1
2
[
N(ti ) − N(ti−1)
]
E(ti − ti−1)
= 1
2
[
N(ti ) − N(ti−1)
]
E(ti )
and thus, Eq. (10) is rewritten as:
E
[ N(ti )∑
k=N(ti−1 )+1
(ti − sk)
]
= E
[
1
2
[
N(ti ) − N(ti−1)
]
E(ti )
]
= E(ti )
2
E
[
N(ti ) − N(ti−1)
]
= E(ti )
2
λd E(ti )
= E(ti )
2
2
λd . (13)
As discussed above, in steady state, the UE departure
rate is exactly the same as the UE arrival rate, i.e., λd = λ.
Fig. 7. Rekeying and disconnection timing diagram.
Eq. (13) is then rewritten as:
E
[ N(ti )∑
k=N(ti−1 )+1
(ti − sk)
]
= E(ti )
2
2
λ.
It is easy to know that φth = E
[∑N(ti )
k=N(ti−1 )+1(ti −sk)
]
, which
yields:
E(ti ) =
√
2φth
λ
, (14)
and hence Eq. (9) is rewritten as:
CD R A = Ts
√
λ
2φth
. (15)
B. Ue Re-Authentication Probability and Re-Authentication
Cost for CN
Let ω, τ , and λR denote the disconnection rate of a UE in
the eMBMS session, the mean value of its disconnection time,
and the rekeying rate in the eMBMS session, respectively.
The disconnection arrivals follow Poisson process with rate
ω. The disconnection time, td , as shown in Fig. 7, is indepen-
dent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables with
CDF Fd (td), pdf fd (td), and the Laplace-Stieltjes Transform:
f ∗d (s) =
∫ ∞
t=0 e
−st fd (t)dt .
Moreover, as shown in Fig. 7, tR0 , tR1 , · · · , tRK denote the
time intervals between rekeying operations in the eMBMS
session with pdf fR(tRK ) and CDF FR(tRK ). Let tr denote
the interval between the UE enters the disconnection period
and the time when the first rekeying operation arrives. Further-
more, let p denote the re-authentication probability when a UE
is in disconnection period. In other words, the probability that
at least one rekeying operation happens in the disconnection
period of the UE is also p. Therefore,
p = P{td > tr } = 1 − P{td ≤ tr }. (16)
The probability that no rekeying operation happens in td is:
P{td ≤ tr } =
∫ ∞
t=0
P{td ≤ tr |tr = t} fr (t)dt
=
∫ ∞
t=0
P{td ≤ t|tr = t} fr (t)dt
=
∫ ∞
t=0
P{td ≤ t} fr (t)dt
=
∫ ∞
t=0
Fd (t) fr (t)dt
=
∫ ∞
t=0
∫ t
td=0
fd (td ) fr (t)dtd dt, (17)
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where fr (t) is the pdf of tr . According to the Excess Life
Theorem in [15],
fr (t) = λR
∫ ∞
s=t
fR(s)ds
= λR
[
1 − FR(t)
]
. (18)
Considering a time interval tu while a UE stays in
the eMBMS session, there are ωtu disconnections hap-
pened totally. The expected value of total disconnections is
ωE[tu] = ω 1θ . An UE then needs to re-authenticate ω 1θ p times
in average in those ω 1θ disconnections. The expected value of
total UE arrivals in the observation time interval Ts is λTs .
The total re-authentication cost for the CN, N , then can be
expressed as:
N =
(
ω
1
θ
p
)(
λTs
)
= ωλTs
θ
p. (19)
1) UE Re-Authentication Probability and Re-Authentication
Cost of TRA: In steady state, the output of M/G/∞ follows
Poisson process in which UE departure rate is exactly the same
as the UE arrival rate. In TRA, whenever a UE joins/leaves the
eMBMS session, rekeying operation is triggered. Therefore,
the rekeying operation is a Poisson process with rate λR = 2λ.
Hence, from Eq. (18), Eq. (17) is rewritten as:
P{td ≤ tr }
=
∫ ∞
t=0
∫ t
td=0
fd (td)λR
[
1 − FR(t)
]
dtddt
=
∫ ∞
t=0
∫ t
td=0
fd (td)λRe−λRt dtd dt
=
∫ ∞
td=0
∫ ∞
t=td
fd (td )λRe−λRt dtdtd
=
∫ ∞
td=0
fd (td)e−λRtd dtd
= f ∗d (λR) = f ∗d (2λ).
Eq. (16) is then rewritten as:
pT R A = 1 − f ∗d (2λ), (20)
and Eq. (19) is given as:
NT R A = ωλTs
θ
pT R A = ωλTs
θ
[
1 − f ∗d (2λ)
]
. (21)
Because the UE’s unexpected disconnection time distribu-
tion, td , is assumed to be a general distribution, here we drive
pT R A and NT R A based on four UE unexpected disconnection
time distributions as follows.
a) Gamma distribution: If fd (t) is the pdf of the Gamma
distribution with a shape parameter π and a scale parameter τπ ,
its Laplace transform f ∗d (s) is given as f ∗d (s) = (1 + τπ s)−π .
Hence, Eqs. (20) and (21) are rewritten as:
pT R A = 1 −
(
1 + 2λτ
π
)−π
,
and
NT R A = ωλTs
θ
[
1 −
(
1 + 2λτ
π
)−π]
,
respectively.
We are especially interested in Gamma distribution. The
reason is that the distribution of any positive random variable
can be approximated by a combination of Gamma distribution
as stated in [17, Lemma 3.9].
b) Hyper-Erlang distribution: It has been shown that
hyper-Erlang distribution has very general approximation
capability for the probability distribution of any positive ran-
dom variable [17], [18]. Its Laplace transform f ∗u (s) is given
as: f ∗u (s) =
∑J
j=1 ω j
(
α j β j
s+α jβ j
)α j
where ω j ≥ 0,∑Jj=1 ω j =
1, and J , α1, α2, · · · , αJ are nonnegative integers. β1, β2,
· · · , βJ are positive numbers.
Hence, Eqs. (20) and (21) are rewritten as:
pT R A = 1 −
J∑
j=1
ω j
( α j β j
2λ + α j β j
)α j
,
and
NT R A = ωλ
θμ
[
1 −
J∑
j=1
ω j
( α j β j
2λ + α jβ j
)α j ]
,
respectively.
The hyper-Erlang distribution can be used to approximate
log-normal distribution which has been used for statistical
fitting [19]. It is also suitable to approximate td that is either
Sum of Hyper-Exponentials (SOHYP) or Coxian distributed
or more generally phase-type distributed [16], [20], [21].
c) Erlang distribution: The Laplace transform of Erlang
distribution, Erlang(k, 1τ ), is given as f ∗u (s) =
(
1
1+τ s
)k
.
Hence, Eqs. (20) and (21) are rewritten as: pT R A = 1 −(
1
1+2τλ
)k
, and NT R A = ωλTsθ
[
1 −
(
1
1+2τλ
)k]
, respectively.
d) Exponential distribution: This distribution is a special
case of Gamma distribution. The Laplace transform of the time
interval, td , with the distribution Exp( 1τ ) is f ∗u (s) = 11+τ s .
Hence, Eqs. (20) and (21) are rewritten as: pT R A = 1 −
1
1+2τλ = 2τλ1+2τλ , and NT R A = ωλTsθ
[
2τλ
1+2τλ
]
= 2ωτλ2Tsθ(1+2τλ) ,
respectively.
2) UE Re-Authentication Probability and Re-Authentication
Cost of DRA: In DRA, from Eq. (14), we have obtained that
the rekeying operation happens per
√
2φth
λ . In other words, we
can obtain rekeying rate λR =
√
λ
2φth . The rekeying operation
then has a pmf given by:
p(m) = 1
Ts
√
2φth
λ
, m ∈ N0,m ∈
[
0,
⌊
Ts
√
λ
2φth
⌋ )
.
Its CDF then is given as:
FR(t) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
m
Ts
√
2φth
λ , m
√
2φth
λ ≤ t < (m + 1)
√
2φth
λ
1, (m + 1)
√
2φth
λ ≤ t < Ts,
(22)
where m ∈ N0,m ∈
[
0, Ts
√
λ
2φth 
)
. Hence, from Eqs. (18)
and (22), Eq. (17) is rewritten as:
P(td ≤ tr )
=
∫ √ 2φth
λ
tr=0
∫ tr
td=0
fd (td) fr (tr )dtd dtr
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(since tr ≤ rekey time interval)
=
∫ √ 2φth
λ
tr=0
∫ tr
td=0
fd (td )λR
[
1 − FR(tr )
]
dtddtr
=
∫ √ 2φth
λ
td=0
∫ √ 2φth
λ
tr=td
fd (td )λR
[
1 − FR(tr )
]
dtr dtd
=
∫ √ 2φth
λ
td=0
∫ √ 2φth
λ
tr=td
fd (td )λRdtr dtd
(
from Eq. (22), FR(tr ) = 0, if 0 ≤ tr <
√
2φth
λ
)
=
∫ √ 2φth
λ
td=0
λR fd (td )
(√2φth
λ
− td
)
dtd
= λR
√
2φth
λ
∫ √ 2φth
λ
td=0
fd (td )dtd − λR
∫ √ 2φth
λ
td=0
fd (td)td dtd
= Fd (
√
2φth
λ
) − Fd (
√
2φth
λ
) + λR
∫ √ 2φth
λ
td=0
Fd (td )dtd
=
√
λ
2φth
∫ √ 2φth
λ
td=0
Fd (td)dtd
Eq. (16) is then rewritten as:
pD R A = 1 −
√
λ
2φth
∫ √ 2φth
λ
td=0
Fd (td)dtd (23)
and Eq. (19) is given as:
ND R A = ωλTs
θ
[
1 −
√
λ
2φth
∫ √ 2φth
λ
td=0
Fd (td )dtd
]
. (24)
Again, we take Gamma distribution, hyper-Erlang distri-
bution, Erlang distribution, and exponential distribution as
examples for the distribution of td .
a) Gamma distribution: If fd (t;π, τπ ) is the pdf of the
Gamma distribution with a shape parameter π and a scale
parameter τπ , its CDF is given as F(t;π, τπ ) =
γ (π, tπτ )
(π) .
Eqs. (23) and (24) are rewritten as:
pD R A = 1 −
√
λ
2φth
∫ √ 2φth
λ
t=0
γ (π, tπτ )
(π)
dt, (25)
and
ND R A = ωλTs
θ
[
1 −
√
λ
2φth
∫ √ 2φth
λ
t=0
γ (π, tπτ )
(π)
dt
]
. (26)
b) Hyper-Erlang distribution: The hyper-Erlang distrib-
ution [18] has the following pdf:
fd (t) =
J∑
j=1
ω j
(α j β j )α j tα j −1
(α j − 1)! e
−α jβ j t , t ≥ 0. (27)
Let Fd (t) denote the CDF of a hyper-Erlang distribution
given in Eq. (27). Let F¯d (t) = 1− Fd (t). It can be derived as:
F¯d (t) =
J∑
j=1
ω j
( α j −1∑
l=0
(α jβ j t)l
l! e
−α j β j t
)
.
Fig. 8. Rekeying cost for UE when various φth values are applied.
Eq. (23) is rewritten as:
pD R A
= 1−
√
λ
2φth
∫ √ 2φth
λ
t=0
[
1 −
J∑
j=1
ω j
(α j−1∑
l=0
(α jβ j t)l
l! e
−α j β j t
)]
dt
=
√
λ
2φth
∫ √ 2φth
λ
t=0
J∑
j=1
ω j
( α j −1∑
l=0
(α jβ j t)l
l! e
−α jβ j t
)
dt . (28)
Eq. (24) is then rewritten as:
ND R A = ωλTs
θ
√
λ
2φth
×
∫ √ 2φth
λ
t=0
J∑
j=1
ω j
( α j −1∑
l=0
(α jβ j t)l
l! e
−α jβ j t
)
dt .
(29)
c) Erlang distribution: The CDF of Erlang distribution
is Fd (t) = 1 − ∑π−1n=0 1n!e−
tπ
τ ( tπτ )
π . Eqs. (23) and (24) are
rewritten as:
pD R A = 1 −
√
λ
2φth
∫ √ 2φth
λ
t=0
[
1 −
π−1∑
n=0
1
n!e
− tπτ ( tπ
τ
)π
]
dt
=
√
λ
2φth
∫ √ 2φth
λ
t=0
π−1∑
n=0
1
n!e
− tπτ ( tπ
τ
)π dt, (30)
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Fig. 9. (a), (b), and (c) show the rekeying cost for CN.
and
ND R A = ωλTs
θ
√
λ
2φth
∫ √ 2φth
λ
t=0
π−1∑
n=0
1
n!e
− tπτ ( tπ
τ
)πdt, (31)
respectively.
d) Exponential distribution: The CDF of exponential
distribution is Fd (t) = 1 − e− 1τ t . Eq. (23) is rewritten as:
pD R A = 1 −
√
λ
2φth
∫ √ 2φth
λ
t=0
(
1 − e− 1τ t
)
dt
= τ
√
λ
2φth
(
1 − e− 1τ
√
2φth
λ
)
. (32)
Eq. (24) is then rewritten as:
ND R A = ωλτTs
θ
√
λ
2φth
(
1 − e− 1τ
√
2φth
λ
)
. (33)
V. SIMULATION AND NUMERIC RESULTS
The analysis presented in Section IV can quantify the
performance of the proposed DRA. It also provides a sys-
tematic way for operators and content providers to choose
different parameters. The analysis was validated by extensive
simulations by using ns-2, version 2.35 [22] with the following
simulation settings: Ts = 5000 sec, tu = 500 sec, τ = 5
sec, λ = 50, and ω = 0.005 (see Table I for details).
In Figs. 9, 10, and 11, the solid/dashed lines denote the
analytical results while the simulation results are presented
by small squares, cycles, x-marks, diamonds, and triangles.
The simulations were conducted with 98% confidence level.
However, the confidence intervals are not drawn here because
they are too small and will overlap with other lines and cycles
significantly which will make the figures difficult to read.
To identify whether the system enters steady state, in our
simulations, we used a time window, tw = 100s, to compute
the average UE departure rate λd and the average UE arrival
rate λ in the time window tw. Once λdλ ≥ 98% continually for
100 sec, we considered that the system entered steady state
and started to record simulation data. Here, the purpose of tw
is to combat against the randomness of λ and λd .
A. Rekeying Cost for UE
We first investigate how the rekeying cost for UE is
affected by the threshold of accumulated free enjoy time, φth .
We compare the performance of TRA and DRA with different
φth values. Fig. 8 illustrates the comparison results. We can
see that DRA significantly decreases the rekeying cost for
UEs. Please note the y-axis in Fig. 8 is logarithmic scale.
Another observation is that by using DRA, rekeying cost for
UE decreases as φth becomes bigger. For example, the UE
rekeying cost drops to 0.158% when DRA is applied with
φth=1000, λ=50, and 1θ =1000. Moreover, when φth rises from
1000 to 30000, the UE rekeying cost further drops by 18.26%.
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Fig. 10. (a) and (b) illustrate the re-authentication probability when a UE is in off-line period.
It demonstrates that adopting DRA with various φth values can
easily adjust the rekeying cost for UEs.
B. Rekeying Cost for Core Network
Figs. 9 (a), (b), and (c) show both the analytical and
simulation results of the rekeying cost for CN in an eMBMS
session in terms of UE arrival rate λ and an observation
time interval Ts . In addition, we plot both the analytical and
simulation results of DRA by considering the accumulated free
enjoying time threshold factor φth with respect to 1000, 5000,
10000, and 30000, respectively. We observe that the rekeying
cost of DRA is much lower than that of TRA. For instance,
the rekeying cost of DRA is only 3.4% of the rekeying cost
of TRA when φth = 1000 and λ = 100, meaning that DRA is
especially suitable for the case that bursty UE arrival/departure
happens. By adjusting φth , operators can easily control the
rekeying load for CN using Eq. (15).
As shown in Fig. 9(a), the more UEs join the eMBMS
session, the higher the rekeying cost is. The reason is that when
a UE joins the eMBMS session, it may stay in the session for
a time tu to enjoy the eMBMS service and then leaves the
session. Once the system enters steady state, in an observation
time interval the number of UEs joining the session is equal
to the number of UEs leaving (as discussed in Section IV-B).
In other words, the UE arrival rate equals the UE departure
rate, λ = λd . As a result, when λ increases, λd also increases,
causing higher rekeying cost.
Moreover, the design rationale of DRA is to fit for large
eMBMS service groups. Generally speaking, eMBMS service
groups with a large number of UEs usually come with frequent
UE leavings/departures, i.e., great λ and λd . Since large
λ and λd lead to high rekeying cost for CN, our design of DRA
is to combat against the impact of large λ and λd . Fig. 9(a)
shows that, as λ increases, the rekeying cost of DRA increases
much slower3 than the rekeying cost of TRA with different φth
values. This validates our design rationale: DRA is scalable to
large eMBMS service groups.
We also depict the impact of the observation time interval Ts
on the rekeying cost for CN in Fig. 9(b). We observe that both
3Please note that Y-axis is logarithmic scale.
the rekeying cost of TRA and DRA increase linearly when Ts
increases (look like exponentially increases due to logarithmic
Y-axis). Fig. 9(b) also shows that the rekeying cost of DRA
is much lower than that of TRA.
As derived in Eqs. (8) and (15), they demonstrate that the
UE staying time tu has no impact on the rekeying cost of
TRA and the rekeying cost of DRA for CN when the system
is in steady state. Fig. 9(c) validates this point: when tu
increases from 100 to 1000, all the curves of TRA and DRA
are horizontal.
In conclusion, DRA serves as an appropriate analytical
model for mobile operators to select a suitable φth to adjust
rekeying load for CN. It is also resilient to the impact of
quick increasing of UE arrival rate and is thus scalable to
large eMBMS service groups. In addition, adopting DRA with
various φth values can reduce CN load significantly.
C. Re-Authentication Probability
In this section, we study the re-authentication probability
when a UE disconnects from the CN. The impact of UE
arrival rate λ on re-authentication probability p is shown in
Figs. 10(a) and (b). In these simulations, λ is scaled from
10 to 100. We can see that the re-authentication probability
of TRA, pT R A, is almost 100% when λ increases from
10 to 100. This indicates that in the simulation setting4 once
a UE is off-line, it needs to perform re-authentication with
almost 100%. It may cause huge re-authentication load for
CN if the number of off-line UEs and the frequency of off-line
UEs are large. In contrast, the re-authentication probabilities of
DRA, pD R A, are much lower than those of TRA. Intuitively,
UEs get less chance to perform re-authentication meaning
that less re-authentication load for CN. We also observe
that pD R A increases when λ becomes larger as shown in
Figs. 10(a) and (b). The reason is that larger λ causes higher
rekeying rate for both TRA and DRA. Once rekeying happens
when a UE is in off-line period, the UE cannot get new
key(s) distributed in its off-line interval. Thus, the UE has
4 pT R A can be less than 100% if the disconnection time, td , and rekeying
rate, λR , are set as very small values.
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Fig. 11. Re-authentication cost for CN.
to re-authenticate itself to get the newest key as discussed
in Section IV-B.
We next investigate how pD R A outperforms pT R A in terms
of the mean value of UE disconnection time τ by changing
τ from 1s to 10s. The results are shown in Fig. 10(b). One
interesting result is that the gap between pT R A and pD R A is
big when τ is small. It demonstrates that DRA is especially
suitable for short-term disconnections. Similarly, we observe
that pD R A becomes larger when τ increases. This is due to the
fact that larger disconnection time τ means higher probability
that rekeying happens in the disconnection time. Indeed, given
a long enough disconnection interval, all UEs have to perform
re-authentication no matter TRA or DRA are used. 3GPP has
defined a timer for such scenarios in [1], [2], and [6], which
is out of scope of this paper.
We conclude that DRA outperforms TRA with respect to
re-authentication probability. Both analytical and simulation
results show that DRA is especially suitable when short-term
unintended disconnection happens frequently. Moreover, we
demonstrate that DRA also outperforms TRA in terms of UE
arrival rate λ. However, when λ is extremely high and/or
τ is very long, pD R A may also approach to 100%. One
solution is to increase φth based on Eq. (25) to obtain satisfied
re-authentication probability for UEs when different distribu-
tions of tu are applied. Figs. 10(a) and (b) also validate that
when φth increases, pD R A becomes smaller.
D. Re-Authentication Cost
For a better illustration of re-authentication cost caused
by UE off-line effect, we investigate the re-authentication
cost for CN. The results are shown in Figs. 11(a)-(e).
We can see that DRA always achieves lower re-authentication
cost for CN than that in TRA. Increasing the accumulated
free enjoy time threshold φth leads to more benefits on
re-authentication load for CN. The curve of re-authentication
cost of TRA is horizontal because its re-authentication prob-
ability is almost 100%. However, Fig. 11(a) shows that the
difference between them dwindles when the mean value of dis-
connection time τ becomes larger. The reason is that larger τ
will lead to higher probability that rekeying happens within it.
Similarly, we can adjust φth to decrease re-authentication cost
based on Eq. (26) when various distribution of tu are applied.
We next compare the performance of TRA and DRA with
re-authentication cost for CN by inspecting Figs. 11(b)-(e).
By a significant margin, DRA outperforms TRA with respect
to re-authentication cost for CN. This is validated by both
analytical and simulation results in terms of UE disconnection
rate ω, UE arrival rate λ, the observation time interval Ts , and
the mean value of UE staying time tu .
Overall, by comparing Figs. 11(a)-(e), DRA significantly
outperforms TRA in terms of re-authentication probability for
UEs and re-authentication cost for CN.
VI. OPTIMAL DRA
In this section, we discuss the selection of φth for DRA.
Recall that we have validated the correctness of the pro-
posed analytical model in Section V. Mobile operators then
can plan and design their network optimization strategies.
In particular, selecting a suitable free enjoy time threshold
φth to balance the security-performance tradeoff is important.
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According to Eq. (15), we observe that CD R A is a func-
tion of φth . A larger φth means fewer rekeying, i.e., less
CD R A. Meanwhile, some revenue will lost due to larger free
enjoy time, and vice versa. Thus, we formulate the objective
function as:
minimize
φth
F = w1CD R A + w2φth,
subject to 0 < φth ≤ φˆ, (34)
where φˆ is the upper bound of φ, which can be determined
by content providers according to their business policies. The
coefficients of w1 and w2 denote the weighting factors for
CD R A and φth , respectively. Increasing w1 (or w2) emphasizes
more on CD R A (or φth). Here, we do not specify either w1
or w2 because such a value should be determined by mobile
operators and should take management policies into considera-
tion. In addition, since CD R A has been derived in Eq. (15), the
optimal value of φth can be found by solving the differential
equation F ′ = 0 and checking the boundary values, i.e., when
φth = 0 and φth = φˆ in F .
VII. RELATED WORK
Previous studies [23]–[27] have addressed the security-
performance tradeoff in wireless networks. In [26], the authors
addressed the tradeoff between security and throughput in
encryption-based wireless security and developed detailed
mathematical models to capture the security-throughput trade-
off. The proposed scheme significantly improves the perfor-
mance compared with traditional approaches. The authors
of [27] presented the first work investigating the tradeoff
between the achievable throughput and the allowable number
of eavesdroppers in a large wireless network. The work well
demonstrated that the wireless network can tolerate a single
eavesdropper with upper bound attack strength. The authors
of [25] studied the tradeoff between routing security and
performance on selecting a routing path in multihop wireless
networks. The authors derived a multipath routing protocol
maximizing the worst-case packet delivery ratio while limiting
the worst-case security risk under given threshold. In [23], the
authors analyzed the coexistence of security mechanisms and
Quality of Service (QoS) mechanisms in resource-constrained
wireless networks. A novel dependency-based model was
proposed to study the security and QoS tradeoff. The authors
of [24] proposed a new dynamic security system architec-
ture that weights the tradeoff between resources, costs and
risks for considering the network security profile to optimize
the performance of communication networks. The proposed
dynamic system allows a better utilization of network resource
and save investments in infrastructure. The authors of [28]
stated that handover key can be threaten due to rogue base
station attacks and formalizes the problem as a tradeoff
between signaling load and security key exposure. A detailed
mathematical model is derived for a network operator to select
an optimal key update interval that fits best with their network
management policies.
Despite of the aforementioned studies, the security-
performance tradeoff between security of multimedia content,
UE signaling overhead, and CN authentication cost were not
taken into consideration in eMBMS.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose a dynamic rekeying algorithm
called DRA to reduce UE signaling overhead and CN authen-
tication cost caused by frequent rekeying with slight com-
promise of the interest of content providers. We develop
analytical and simulation models to investigate the signaling
overhead of a UE, C , authentication cost of the CN, N ,
and revenue loss of a content providers, φ. Our performance
study provides theoretical guidances and a systematic way for
network operators to configure rekeying time interval. When
UE arrival/departure rate is higher, the proposed DRA can
work more effectively in terms of reducing UE signaling
overhead and CN authentication cost.
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